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Former Virginia governor Robert McDonnell (R) returns to court to ltear the jury's verdict Thursday.

BY JEFFREY BELLIN

he guilty verdicts in the trial of former Virginia
governor - and Republican sinking star - Robett
McDonnell highlight an ugly tension between America's politics and its public cormption laws. Beyond the pricey
gifts, unraveling marriage and throw-your-wife-under-thebus defense that dominated the media coverage lies a more
important story. The real stars of this drama were the vague
public corruption statutes that took down the former
governor and the elusive distinction they draw between
"politics as usual" and criminality.
McDonnell was not charged with bribery. As is common
in this context, federal prosecutors charged him with the
easier-to-prove crimes of fraud and e>.t01tion. The fraud
counts were based on a statute that prohibits devising a
"scheme or artifice to defraud" through the "wire[s]." The
extortion counts were based on a statute that prohibits
obtaining property "under color of official right." Both
offenses are punishable by up to 20 years in prison.
The fraud theory works like this: As governor; McDonnell
was supposed to act on behalf of the people of Virginia.
Instead, he solicited money from a private company to act as
needed on its behalf, thus defrauding Virginians of a (small)
portion of McDonnell's "honest services!' The e>.tortion
theory is similar. McDonnell obtained private property that
he was not entitled to in return for a promise to perform
official acts 01; in the language of the statute, obtained
money under "color of official right!'
These commonly invoked charges are powerful
anti-corruption tools: so powerful, in fact, that they appear
to criminalize 111de swaths of U.S. politics. Companies,
unions and individuals give generously to politicians and
their surrogates every year. An industrious prosecutor could
find boatloads of officials who benefited from these gifts and
then took action on behalf of those entities. Is this also
"honest services" fraud and extortion? Legally speaking, the
answer is: "Who knows?" The distinction between a
successful fund raiser and a diabolical crook is frighteningly
subtle.
The Snpreme Comt insists that there is a clear distinction
between the felony offenses that upended McDonnell and
our tried-and-tme system of allowing private entities and
individuals to shower government officials with campaign
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contributions and other gifts. That distinction comes down
to the contents of the official's mind. To prove "honest
services" fraud or political e>.tortion, a prosecutor must
show that someone like McDonnell accepted a particular
donation with the understanding that he would perform
official acts in return. This agreement to trade gifts for acts is
all that separates "politics as usual" from felony corruption.
Critically, the corrupt agreement need not be documented, or even articulated. The prosecution's proof, as in the
McDonnell case, normally takes the form of evidence that
money went to a public servant and official acts followed.
The jury can infer the requisite agreement from the
circumstantial evidence. If a jury sees "knowing winks and
nods" (tile actual jury instruction) in the flow of money from
donor to candidate, federal prison awaits.
Consistent with these principles, the McDonnell jury's
90-page instructions informed it that it could not convict the
ex-governor for the things it likely found most distasteful:
his soliciting personal gifts, exercising terrible judgment or
prompting underlings to help a guy who paid for a family
wedding. Rather, the verdict rested on whether, in all these
perfectly legal actions, thejmyperceived the kno1vingwinks
and nods that are all the law requires to turn donations into
federal felonies. That should send chills down the spines of
public officials across the country. Which, admittedly, might
not be so bad.
It would be both \vise (to avoid prison) and good policy for
officials to discourage large donations, avoid decisions that
benefit big donors and generally disengage from contributors. But until that happens, we are stuck with a system in
which lots of public officials could be convicted of a felony
but few are prosecuted.
That's not healthy for a democracy. It gives prosecutors
vast discretion to choose targets, undermines the credibility
of prosecutions that do occur and, ultimately, says something very unsettling about our government. Something has
to give. We either need to strengthen our campaign finance
laws or, if that's impossible, acknowledge that our public
corruption laws are merely aspirational. A political system
where any given federal, state or local official is just a wink,
nod and a motivated prosecutor away from federal prosecution is untenable.
The writer is an associate professor at William & Mary Law School.
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